

KENNY'S



The
Emergency
In
Malaya
1948 – 1960

A
Collection
Of
Police
Intelligence
Files

Introduction

File No: 1 in this collection of documents begins with a telegram “*D.J. O’Duffy requesting you report to room 718, Colonial Office, Sanctuary Buildings, Great Smith Street, Westminster, London, at 11am, Wednesday fourth, respecting Malaya. Stop. Bring passport. Secretary Colonial Office*”.

Mr. O’Duffy worked as an Intelligence Officer with the English Police in Malaya from 1948 – 1960. He brought these files back to Ireland with a view to writing a book on the Emergency. The book was never completed though parts of the manuscript are included in the Archive.

The Archive is, we believe, a unique collection of documents relating to Malaya. The files include several hundred “Secret” and “Top Secret” documents. In addition to the Intelligence Files it also offers an insight into the Social History of Malaya during this period.

This material paints a comprehensive and highly detailed picture of police, army and intelligence activity during the Malayan Emergency. Take, for example, one of the sample documents contained here. It lists the names eliminated by the SAS, NZ Reg, Police etc in “Operation Ginger”. This level of personal detail is typical of the whole collection.

There is also a large amount of Mr O’Duffy’s personal material contained in seven files, including manuscript relating to his intended books, job applications, social correspondences etc.

The collection includes various security-related publications from that period. Examples are; 15 books and manuals including “The Emergency Regulations Ordinance 1948” plus 100 (approx.) magazines including “The Security Gazette” and the “Malayan Police Magazine”.

D.J. O'Duffy Collection of Intelligence Files

22 Standard A4 files

Each files contains about 200 items.

The Emergency in Malaya 1948 – 1960

Chronological Summary of Events

First Period: 1928-45

Formation and Development of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)

- 1928** South Seas Communist Party established in Singapore
- 1930** Seas Party renamed Malayan Communist Party (MCP) directed by Far Eastern Bureau of Russian Communist Party in Shanghai. Ho Chi Minh attends Party conference in Singapore
- 1931** Intelligence coup in Singapore leads to widespread arrests of Communists in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, including Ho Chi Minh (who was imprisoned in Hong Kong)
- 1934** Lai Tek joins MCP in Singapore
- 1939** Lai Tek becomes Secretary General of MCP
- 1941**
- June Russia joins Western alliance on invasion by Germany
MCP (Lai Tek) offers to cooperate with British in Singapore
- Dec. 200 Communists trained by British as stay-behind guerrillas (later named Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army)
- 1942**
- Feb. Fall of Singapore
- Aug. Majority of MCP Central Committee arrested by Japanese in Singapore
- Sept. 90 leading Malayan Communists massacred by Japanese in Batu caves
- 1943** British Force 136 (Colonel John Davis) joins MPAJA to train guerrillas and organize supply of weapons, ammunition, etc. by parachute and submarine. Chin Peng acts as MPAJA liaison officer
- 1945**
- Aug. Japanese surrender forestalls British landings. MPAJA sizes control from Japanese in some areas
- Sept. British military government re-establishes control
- Dec. MPAJA disbands, Guerrillas rewarded on handing in weapons but retain Large hidden dumps of other weapons and supplies in the jungle. MPAJA "Old Comrades' Association" maintains shadow guerrilla army

Second Period: 1946 - 60

The War Against Communism

1946

Rival Kuomintang and Communist bandit gangs extorting money.

Communist bandit gangs extorting money. Communist subversion through

Front organizations, schools and trade unions

1947

March

Lai Tek disappears. Chin Peng becomes Secretary General of MCP. 300 major strikes in year

1948

March

Communist conference in Calcutta decides on armed revolution throughout Southeast Asia. Outbreaks of rioting, sabotage, and assassination in Malaya

May

Legislation to curb Communist control of trade unions

June

MCP orders mobilization. Ex-members of MPAJA recalled to reform 8 Regiments of guerrilla army with Minh Yuen (people's organization) to them.

Government declares state of emergency. Emergency Regulations include 100 per cent registration of

Political Developments

1946

British Government imposes Malayan Union, lowering status of Malay

Sultans and offering full citizenship to immigrant races (Chinese and Indians), with declared aim of self-government. Malays boycott

Inauguration of Union and Dato Onn bin Jaafar forms United Malay National Organization (UMNO) to oppose it

1948

February

British Government abandons plan for Malayan Union

Federation of Malaya formed, consisting of the 9 Malay states and 2 British Settlements of Penang and Malacca. (Singapore remains separate colony, as its predominantly Chinese population would swamp Malay majority in Federation)

Malayan members join Executive and Legislative councils, and are given increasing responsibility for administration

1949

Feb.

Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) formed by Tan Cheng Lok. Aims to attract village Chinese away from Communism, in view of collapse of Kuomintang

Chinese commercial community raises \$2.5 million by lottery for MCA to improve conditions in Chinese villages

adult population and power to detain without trial

1949

Jan.

Output of new trainees raises police strength from 9,000 to 50,000
Extra army units from Britain

April

Chin Peng's hope of a popular rising fails

Communist army withdraws into deep jungle to regroup. Renamed "Malayan Races' Liberation Army" (MRLA)

Sharp fall in terrorist activity gives rise to premature optimism

Oct.

MRLA resumes offensive, operating in big units to terrorize population
Into acquiescence and to oust police from villages.

British-Malayan Army, also operating in big units, fails either to kill guerrillas or to prevent terrorism

1950

Terrorists murders of civilians rise to 100 per month

April

General Sir Harold Briggs appointed Director of Operations to control all Counterinsurgency operations – civil, police and military. Resettlement of 423,000 isolated Chinese squatters into New Villages begins

1951

Oct.

Violence reaches peak with assassination of High Commissioner. Meanwhile, army units operating in smaller patrols forcing big guerrilla Units to split up. MCP issues directive switching emphasis from wholesale violence to selective terror and subversion

Nov.

Resettlement completed Sir Harold

1951

Dato Onn abandons UMNO and forms multiracial Independence of Malaya Party (IMP).

Tunku Abdul Rahman becomes President of UMNO

1952

9 of 11 seats on Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council. IMP only wins 2

Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) joins Alliance, combining all three Malayan races in one party

Briggs retires and dies soon afterwards

1952

Feb.

General Sir Gerald Templer appointed as combined High Commissioner and Director of Operations. British reiterate that Independence for Malaya Incident rate begins to fall as Briggs Plan takes effect. Many more guerrillas being killed as a result of information from the people and from surrendered guerrillas

1953

Communist losses reach a peak with growing number of police agents among supporters.

First jungle forts established in aborigine areas, with arrival of helicopter squadrons

First white are declared – freed from Emergency Regulations

1954

June

Templer returns to Britain having wiped out two thirds of guerrilla strength.

Incident rate and murder rate cut to 20 per cent of 1951 peak.

1955

Plan launched to clear weakest areas first, leaving hard core till last

June

Chin Peng makes indirect overtures for peace talks

July

Tunku Abdul Rahman becomes Chairman of Emergency Operations Council, taking over direction of war Alliance Party wins 51 of 52 elected

1953

Alliance Party demands self-government at once, independence within 3 years. It demands that during self-government period 60 per cent of members of Legislative Council should be elected, leaving 40 per cent nominated by High Commissioner until independence

1954

Templer announces that first elections for self-government will be in 1955, with 52 elected and 46 nominated members

1955

March

Singapore becomes self-governing with elected majority in legislature, still separate from Federation

July

Alliance Party wins 51 of 52 elected seats in Legislative Council and takes majority control of Executive Council, with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister

High Commissioner retains power of veto until full independence (1957) but never uses it

1956

Date for independence and draft constitution agreed on in London

seats in Legislative Council and takes Majority control of Executive Council, with Tunku Abdul Rahman as Chief Minister

Dec.

Truce talks. Tunku Abdul Rahman refuses to agree to Communists' operating as a legal political party, talks break down

1956

Most of Eastern Malaya is declared white area. Troops withdrawn to concentrate on blacker areas in turn

1957

White area extended across the center of the country, including Kuala Lumpur

1958

Crumble begins with collapse of all but hard-core areas, largely due to exploitation of two high-ranking surrendered Communists

1959

All troops concentrated on two hard-core areas

1960

State of emergency ends, with all Malaya cleared of guerrillas except for Chin Peng and 400 survivors astride Thai border

1957

Aug. 31st

Merdeka (Independence Day)

High Commissioner leaves.

Tunku Abdul Rahman becomes Prime Minister

1959

At first post independence elections in Malaya, Alliance Party wins 74 of 104 seats. Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party (PAP) wins Singapore election with increased power of self-government, calls for merger with Federation.

Third Period: 1961-66

1961

May Tunku Abdul Rahman proposes formation of Malaysia

Nov. Tunku Abdul Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew exchange heads of agreement for Merger between Malaya and Singapore

Dr. Subandrio, Indonesian Foreign Minister, informs United Nations that his Government has no objection to inclusion of British North Borneo

Dependencies in Malaysia

Government of Philippines claims part of North Boreno

1962

Britain finds majority of North Borneo peoples want merger with Malaya and Agrees to proposal

Sept. Singapore referendum shows 71 per cent favour merger

Dec. Revolt in Brunei fails. Indonesia declares “confrontation” policy

1963

April Indonesian guerrillas start raiding North Borneo territories (Sabah and Sarawak)

July Manila accord. President Sukarno of Indonesia pledges support for Malaysia
U.N. Secretary General ascertains that it has popular support in Sabah and Sarawak

Aug. U.N. mission arrives in Sabah and Sarawak

Sept. U.N. Secretary General announces popular majority supports Malaysia.
Malaysia inaugurated, with Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak becoming Independent from Britain and joining enlarged Federation
Sukarno withdraws diplomatic status from Federation’s ambassador in Indonesia

Lee Kuan Yew re-elected with 37-to-14 majority

1964

April Tunku Abdul Rahman re-elected with increased majority (89 to 15)

Indonesian guerrillas land on mainland of Malaya, get no popular support and are quickly mopped up

1965

Jan. Government of Philippines agrees to recognize Malaysia if Malaysia will Submit their dispute over Sabah to the International Court
Indonesia withdraws from U.N. on election of Malaysia to Security Council, Concentrates troops as if for an invasion of Malaysia

Aug. Malaysian Government asks Singapore to leave the Federation, and Lee Kuan Yew agrees to do so. Singapore becomes an independent state, but Lee Kuan Yew promises close economic and defence cooperation with Malaysia, and Asks that the British base remain

Oct. Attempted pro-Communist coup in Indonesia failed

1966

March Army regime took control in Indonesia
Confrontation formally ended

Malayan Emergency

The 1948 to 1960 civil war in Malayan archipelago in which Communist-led guerrillas known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army (mainly ethnic Chinese Malaysians) were eventually defeated by British and Malayan troops.

These were many of the same guerrillas who had fought the Japanese during World War II occupation. They resented the political dominance (under the British) of the Malays and Indians.

The British colonial government was able to win the support of the majority Malay and Indian population, thus cutting the guerrillas off from their source of supply, with the acceleration of plans for independence, which came in 1963.

This experience was widely cited as the example of how to win a guerrilla war against a Communist insurgency. (The military tactics used were therefore adopted during the Vietnam War, but were ultimately ineffective because conditions in the two countries were radically different: The situation in Malaya [now Malaysia] was relatively favourable to counterinsurgency efforts, whereas in Vietnam the fundamental lack of legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government was a problem that could not be overcome).

File No.1

August 1948 – June 1950. Pages: 202. Secret: 11. Top Secret: 7

Begins with a **telegram** “D.J. O’Duffy requesting you report to room 718, Colonial Office Sanctuary Buildings, Great Smith Street, Westminster, London, at 11am, Wednesday fourth, respecting Malaya, stop bring pas sport, Secretary Colonial Office”.

“Top Secret & Personal” – Police Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, 4th October 1948.

It has come to my notice that third degree methods are being used by police in interrogating persona who have been arrested. In some cases European police officers have been present when force has been used.

This practice will cease immediately.

You will appreciate the great damage that can be done to the good name of the Force should reports of this nature reach the ears of the Press, and I require you to take urgent and discreet steps to ensure that the officers under your command understand that they may not go to beyond the normal method of interrogation and that force is never to be used.

This letter must be acknowledged.

(W.N. Gray) Commissioner of Police

“Secret” Police Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, 31st March 1949

All Chief Police Officers (2 copies)

Malayan Chinese Association

It is the Government’s policy to cooperate with the Malayan Chinese Association and to expect cooperation from the Association.

The Malayan Chinese Association is proposing to nominate not more than two members in each State/Settlement for liaison or contact duties with the police.

When these representatives are nominated, Chief Police Officers will ensure that they are reasonably accessible to them.

The object of any such conversations will be mainly to discuss practical means whereby the Malayan Chinese Association can assist the police and Government. The Malayan Chinese Association have already indicated to His Excellency the High Commissioner that they are prepared to assist in and undertake considerable responsibility for the removal of squatters from danger areas.

Care should be taken to ensure that no breaches of security occur in these conversations and on no account will any hint be given of impending operations against squatter areas or bandits in general.

It will be realized that it is important to keep in touch with the Chinese and they as a whole must not be alienated.

(W.N. Gray) Commissioner of Police

Newspaper clipping – ‘Man Of Iron’ In Malaya by Bryan Samain.

William Nicol Gray, ex-Commando colonel and former Inspector-General of the Palestine Constabulary, is now, as Commissioner, leading Malaya’s police in the fight against the jungle terrorists.

Draft

Appendix ‘C’ to P.C.O.R. Standing Order No. 5

Instruction to Planters/Miners of Bodyguards and Safe Custody Of Arms

1. *Bodyguards are allocated to Planters/Miners at the discretion of the C.P.O. and S.W.E.C. (vide Yellow Book, para 6)*
2. *Where the Planter/Miner is an A.P. Hon Inspector, his exercises full operational command over the bodyguard. If the Planter/Miner is not an A.P. then his requests are conveyed to the senior S.C. in the bodyguard, who in turn issues the necessary order.*
3. *All S.C.’s allocated to Planters/Miners as bodyguards are to be utilised for the sole protection of the Planters/Miners and their families and will not be used (vide Yellow Book, para 7) for the protection of factory areas, labour lines and vehicles. The practice of allowing one or two of the bodyguards to remain with the transport while out on daily rounds is fundamentally unsound as it not only reduces the allotted strength of the Planters/Miner’s personal escort but offers an easy alternative target.*

Including Part II (B) Secret. Special Branch Perak. Annual Report For 1949
IPOH January 9th, 1950

Confidential

Recommendation for Monetary Reward To Subordinate Police Officer Or Constable
Of The Uniformed Branch

Number: 435
1789
13072

Name: E. Sgt. Spearman

L. Cpl. Osman bin Taib
P.C. Ramli bin Yahya

Length of Service:

Station: Kuala Kangsar

Report No:

Reasons for Recommendation

At 8.30 am on 10.12.49 a party of Police including Specials and a Detective under No. 435 E/Sgt. Spearman, comprising 13 men (due to commitments elsewhere), while operating in the Ulu Sg. Chwor area, VD658120 were fired at by a bandit sentry. One shot was followed by a burst of automatic fire. The leading Scout, SC. 29723 (ex) Moosda was hit in the stomach and died in hospital.

The place at which the Police were fired at was in thick jungle on a very steep and slippery slope, with the ground falling sharply to one side.

The squad on being fired at, took cover, E/Sgt. Spearman, L/Cpl. Osman and P.C. Ramli opened fire, while First Aid was given to the wounded man.

E/Sgt. Spearman called for volunteers to recess the bandit position. L.Cpl. Osman and P.C. Ramli volunteered and went forward with E/Sgt. Spearman.

This small party went forward to a point from which a large bandit camp was sighted.

E/Sgt. Spearman decided in view of the size of his volunteer party, and on account of the wounded man to return to base for re-enforcements. In my opinion E/S t. Spearman did this most correctly.

This was the first encounter by men of the K. Kangsar Jungle Squad with bandits since May 1949: and I think that the wounding of the Police Scout did nothing to improve morale.

It says much for the courage and devotion to duty of E/Sgt. Spearman, and for L/Cpl. Osman and P.C. Ramli who went forward with E/Sgt. Spearman as volunteers and thereby located a camp, at a time when morale was apparently low.

I recommen rewards of \$75 in respect of E.Sgt. Spearman and \$50 each in respect of L.Cpl. Osman and P.C. Ramli.

Chief Police Officer: Perak.
Date: 23.1.50

File No: 2

June 1950 – September 1950. Pages: 174. Secret: 12. Top Secret: 2

Top Secret

9th June 1950

Chief Police Officer, Perak

Subject: Security Situation – Sungei Siput

The London Office of Perak Rubber Plantations Limited have addressed themselves to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the security situation in the Sungei Siput area of Perak.

Appended below are extracts copies from their report

“SPENCE TODAY TELEPHONED SILVARYS 9TH MILE BUNGALOW BURNT OUT LAST NIGHT DURING HEAVY BANDIT ATTACK INSURANCE COMPENSATION IN HAND THROUGH HARPER GILFILLAN STOP BANDITS COLLECTED SIX HUNDRED IDENTITY CARDS INCLUDING THOSE ENTIRE KRUDDA LABOUR FORCE LETTER FOLLOWING

Harricros

For your guidance, the name Spencer refers to the Estate Manager and that of Silvary to the Estate Conductor.

Chinese Tappers on two occasions since April 1st have failed to turn up at 6am owing to Booby Traps laid across the Plus Road resulting in a loss of 3,000 lbs.

Memorandum on the Question of Bombing Sakai Ladangs

I have heard many synthesised arguments in favour of bombing Sakai Ladangs but up to date I have not been able to discover a clear-cut statement of the objects. I suggest that certain confusion exists on the subject, which has led to this proposal, which I can only regard as an expediency born of frustration and an inability to cope with the problem of Communists living in Sakai Ladangs separated from our forces by what appears to be insoluble difficulties of terrain, time and space.

I imagine, however, the object of bombing Sakai ladangs is basically the same as in the case of all other Military or Police operations, that is to say, the killing of Communists. There appears to be the additional object of separating the Sakai from the Communists in their ladangs by the use of the bomb as a terror weapon.

It is incumbent on Government to decide whether bombing does in fact achieve these objects and, if so, is this policy justified when all factors are taken into account. These factors I regard as being threefold, namely, Moral, Political and Military and it is proposed to examine them in that order.

The logical extension of the proposal to bomb Sakai ladangs because Communists use them, is to bomb Chinese Squatter areas too. If the latter were suggested would not the question be raised that the innocent were to be killed with the guilty? I cannot believe that the Sakai are any more guilty than the Chinese Squatters and, in fact, when one considers the remoteness of these ladangs, the illiteracy of the people, that the Sakai have been under Communist domination for years and uncontrolled by Government for decades, that traditionally they have been friendly to the Chinese, one can only conclude that they are far less guilty than the squatters on whom the Communist exist.

Confidential

Adviser on Aborigines, c/o Department of Social Welfare, Kuala Lumpur

25th, June 1950

Sir,

I have the honour to attach herewith various memoranda listed below which have been prepared by the Department of the Adviser on Aborigines with the object of aiding local authorities in the administration of the aborigines. These have been prepared with particular reference to the present emergency and tend to show the aboriginal viewpoint which is not always appreciated by those not in direct touch with these people.

Additional copies of any of these papers may be obtained from this department.

The following papers are attached;

- I. Some Factors affecting the Evacuation of Aboriginal Groups during the Present Emergency*
- II. The Evacuation of Aboriginal Groups during the Present Emergency*
- III. The Administration of Temporary Resettlement Areas for the Aborigines*

Further papers will follow in due course

*I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant*

*Advisor on Aborigines, Federation of Malaya
P.D. Rider Williams-Hunt*

Secret

*Adv. HQ North Malaya Sub-District
Contingent Police HQ,
IPOH.*

*Tel: IPOH 825
No. NMSD (I)/540/G*

*HG Malaya District
Special Branch Police HQ Kuala Lumpur (Copy No. 5)*

Subject: Adv. North Malays Sub-District Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 6

Herewith for your information copies, as shown, of our Weekly intelligence Summary No. 6.

<i>Distribution</i>	<i>Copy No.</i>
<i>HG North Malaya Sub-District</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>4 H</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>1 Koyli</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>2 Malay</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>3 Malay</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>1902 AOP Flt.</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>2 GDS BDE</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>2 Coldm GDS</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>48 Gurkha BDE</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>3 CDO BDE</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>CPO Kedah/Perlis</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>CPO Kelantan</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>CPO Perak</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>OC CID & SIB</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>I.O.</i>	<i>20-21</i>
<i>File</i>	<i>22</i>

Personal & Confidential

Office of Commissioner of Police Kuala Lumpur

22nd July 1950

*Chief Police Officer,
Perak.*

Special Constabulary

I was alarmed to find on my recent visit to your Contingent that in spite of the law and clear and detailed instructions issued by this Headquarters, members of the Special Constabulary in Perak have been allowed to resign. I can only assume that the Emergency Regulation concerned and the Headquarters instructions have not been understood by you and your staff, or that they have been ignored.

Sections II and IIA of the Essential (Special Constabulary) Regulations, 1948 make it abundantly clear that a Special Constable who has been mobilized for active service may not resign. This fact was repeated and stressed in this Headquarters letter No. CP/FM/485/48/049 dated 14th January, 1949. Instructions regarding the dismissal, discharge and termination of appointment of members of the Special Constabulary

were referred to in this Headquarters letter No. CP/FM/485/049 Pt. III dated 14th October, 1949 and were given in detail in a subsequent Headquarters letter of the same number dated 29th October 1949.

I wish you to give this matter your urgent attention and take whatever steps may be necessary to ensure that the Emergency Regulation and instructions referred to above are adhered to strictly.

W.N. Gray
Commissioner of Police

File No: 3

September 1950 – December 1950. Pages: 164. Secret: 13. Top Secret: 1

Secret

(CP (SR) 309)

Contingent Police HQ.,
Perak.

IPOH, 13th September 1950

To: All O.S.P.C's
All O.C.P.D's
O.C., Police, Selama

c.c. C.O.O.
O.C., C.I.D.

Subject: Patrolling

The following Directive received from the Commissioner of Police on the subject of Patrolling is forwarded for your information.

Please ensure that the instructions contained therein are strictly adhered to by all formations under your command and that O.C.P.D's call conferences of their officers in charge of Stations to explain this policy, in accordance with para. 8 of the Directive.

A.S. Barham, Ag. Chief Police Officer, Perak

Secret

20th September 1950

To: O.C. C.I.D., Perak,
Ipoh

Subject: Mr. Cowling, Estate Manager

With reference to your Police message D/4/PT2/9/18 dated the 18th September 1950.

I have spoken to O.S.P.C. Perak South on this subject. I object to Mr. Cowling being interviewed by Radio Malaya for the following reasons;

On the 15th September 1950 at approx. 9.10am, Mr. Cowling came to my office and stated that he was going to Singapore. He asked whether he could deposit his automatic revolver with me for safe keeping. I thought this strange and asked him why he wanted to leave his pistol with me and go unarmed through a dangerous area, especially as he was too late to accompany the military convoy. Mr. Cowling replied that he would catch the convoy on its way down to Tapah and that he wanted to deposited his revolver with me as it would take too long to deposit the weapon at any other station. I was satisfied with this explanation and accepted the revolver for sake keeping.

Mr. Cowling proceeded on his way. Later the same morning I was informed that a jeep in which Mr. Cowling was travelling had been stopped by bandits. The jeep had been burnt and Mr. Cowling and the other occupant of the jeep allowed were allowed to go on their way. I naturally though this strange as I was unaware of any other European being allowed to proceed or even remain alive after being in the hands of bandits. After accepting the fact that he had been allowed to live, my next thought was that it was extremely lucky for him that he was unarmed. A few days after this incident I attended a meeting at District Office. During conversation I mentioned how lucky Mr. Cowling had been. Captain Hunter, Office Commanding X Troop, 45 Marine Commando, who was also present at the meeting then stated that Mr. Cowling had said in his presence that he (Cowling) never felt safe travelling with an escort, and preferred to drive about with the son of the old cook boy, as the boy was known to the bandits and knew all their signals such as hanging out pieces of gunny sack on the windscreen of the vehicle. I requested Capt. Hunter to record his information in statement form. His statement is attached and is self-explanatory.

I have made no further enquiries as Mr. Cowling is at present in Singapore, in any case I would not have taken any action without prior reference to you. I do not know if the person accompanying Cowling on the day in question was in fact the cook-boy referred to. Perusal at the Tapah report dealing with the case would clarify this point.

I have been informed in a roundabout way that Mr. Cowling is not a European, but is in fact Eurasian. I have no concrete evidence as to the truth of this, but having seen Mr. Cowling I would say that anyone would take him for European and that unless a bandit was particularly well versed with his background, he would accept Mr. Cowling as European.

Submitted for your information.

*E. Birro
O.C.P.D.
Cameron Highlands*

Memorandum

On Federation of Malaya Police Force dated 14th November 1950

Manpower

Original Strength

The strength of the Force at the outbreak of the Emergency in June, 1948 was:

- a.

<i>Officers</i>	<i>150</i>	
<i>Inspectors</i>	<i>189</i>	
<i>Rank and File</i>		<i>10,774</i>

- b. *The Officer figures include both European and Asian Officers*

- c. *The Inspectorate was and is, with very few exceptions, entirely Asian*

- d. *The rank and file figures include detectives but not civilian clerical or other staff*

File No: 4

December 1950 – August 1951. Pages: 125 Secret: 12 Top Secret: 4

Secret

*Perak Combined Headquarters Weekly Operational Intelligence Summary
Number PK/ISUM/19/51 From 30.4.51 to 7.5.51*

<u><i>Enemy Losses</i></u>	<u><i>Civilian Losses</i></u>	<u><i>Military & Police Losses</i></u>
<i>Killed: 11</i>	<i>Murdered: 6</i>	<i>Killed (Mil): 1</i>
<i>Suspects arrested</i>		
<i>Wounded: 2</i>	<i>Wounded: 2</i>	<i>Killed (Pol): 2</i>
<i>Suspects arrested</i>		
<i>Unwounded: 2</i>		<i>Wounded: (Mil): 1</i>
<i>Surrendered: 1</i>		<i>Wounded: (Pol): 1</i>

Private & Confidential

*The Kinta Omnibus Co. Ltd.,
88, Brewster Road.*

Ipoh: 19th January 1951

*The O.S.P.C.
Ipoh.*

Sir,

Buses Destroyed by Bandits

We are directed to refer to;

The simultaneous loss of two more of this Company's buses at the Ipoh – Kampar road 16th mile on the evening of the 17th instant, and

The attempt made by bandits on the 18th instant to destroy another bus at a point about 2 miles from Malim Nawar. In this case police personnel were in the bus and they engaged the bandits with the result that the attempt to burn the bus was unsuccessful. Unfortunately the bus conductor and a passenger were killed during the engagement.

We are also directed to point out that about a fortnight ago the Traffic Branch took action against some 'pirate' taxi operators and that a few days ago the Gopeng Police took similar action against others, who ply illegally for hire for the carriage of passengers between Ipoh and Kampar.

We are further to say that from experience these attacks on buses were reprisals against police action against the 'pirate' cars.

It will therefore be greatly appreciated if the Authorities will make full investigation into the Activities of these 'pirate' taxi operators as they would appear to be both the means of conveying up-to-date information re new or newly reconditioned vehicles and also the method of transporting petrol and gunny sacks to the place of ambush.

We trust that the Authorities will take appropriate action.

Yours faithfully

*THE KINDA OMNIBUS CO. LTD
For Law & Co.*

Confidential

*Contingent Police Headquarters, Perak
Ipoh, May 21st, 1951*

*Chief Police Officer,
Perak.*

Subject: Police Jungle Squads

In order to be in a position to reply to frequent outside criticism of Police Jungle Squads, I have personally gone into the figures of "kills" and "captures" by Police from the period beginning 1st July 1950 up to to-days date. These are as follows:

*Bandits Killed: 62
Bandits Captured: 9*

The total numbers are in actual fact higher than this as I have purposely omitted any casualties caused to bandits when Police and Military have been operating together, though some of these casualties have probably been caused by Police. An example of this is a bandit shot by a Police/Military party in the Grik area on 26th April, O.C. Operations Grik, was with the party and states that the bandit was definitely killed by Police fire.

Almost all the casualties give in para.1 have been caused by Jungle Squads. The total number of personnel employed in Jungle Squads is 961 (i.e. one battalion) of whom 60 are employed on re-settlement duties. The Jungle Squads are ill-equipped, ill-clothed and ill-trained and often, due to inexperienced Officers and P.Lts., ill-led. Despite these drawbacks they have been responsible for almost 50% of the bandit casualties in the State, though their own casualties have been high.

The squads are spread over the entire State and due to lack of reserves, get little rest or chance for training. Taking all this into account I consider the frequent criticism against them is most unwarranted. I also feel strongly that Police Officers should be put in the picture about these facts so that they may be in a position to reply to criticism and so do something to boost the moral of the Police.

*J.M. Penly
Contingent Operations Officer,
Perak.*

File No: 5

August 1951 – December 1952. Pages: 180 Secret: 11 Top Secret: 1

*Contingent Police Headquarters,
Perak.*

Ipoh September 15th 1951

Subject: Booby Traps

I enclose herewith Tapah Report No. 1153/51 dated 7.Sept.'51 for your information.

“On September 4th at approx. 06.30hrs. a male Chinese Mining labourer with 8 other Chinese Mining labourers were proceeding in a motor lorry along a mining track from the Tanah Mas Resettlement area towards the Nampe Mining Kongsu. The labourers came across at a place about ¼th mile from the Resettlement area, a Communist Banner with Chinese slogans placed across the track. On either side of the banner was a Communist flag and a Communist poster pasted on a square piece of bamboo framework with a bamboo staff.

The labourers returned to the Resettlement area and informed the Police. As a result of the information the Tapah Police Jungle Squad proceeded to the scene to remove

the banner, the flag and the poster. It was discovered that the poster was booby trapped and the grenade which was buried at the foot of the staff exploded when a member of the Police Jungle Squad was pulling it out. There were no casualties, because the grenade exploded when it was still buried in the earth and the splinters caused no injury”.

*J.M. Penly
Contingent Operations Officer, Perak*

Top Secret

*Circle Police HQ., Perak South, Tapah.
29th September 1951*

*Tapah District Curfew No. 5
Op: “Gherkin”*

On 8.9.51 a 22 hour curfew was imposed on the area lying SOUTH of SUNGEI BIDOR and NORTH of SUNGEI KLAH. The curfew was strictly enforced and few passes were issued. The entire area consists mainly of rubber estates both European and Small-Holdings and as a result of the curfew all these estates went out of tapping. This drastic action was taken as a result of a very high bandit incident rate which had been obtaining in the area during the previous 3-4 weeks, resulting in the European planters approaching the Police with a demand that something be done and done quickly.

The curfew was finally lifted at 0800 hours on 24.9.51

Secret

CPO.Pk.Secret.3/2/51/36

*Contingent Police Headquarters,
Perak.
IPOH.*

15th October 1951

*All O.S.P.C's
All O.C.P.D's*

Bandits Tactics – Attacks On Europeans

Reports received indicate that the bandits intent to intensify their attacks on European, and that a specific date i.e. 15th October has been fixed by them for the commencement of this particular effort.

There is, in my opinion, no need for undue alarm, but O.S.P.C's and O.C.P.D.'s should persuade planters and miners through their representative bodies to avoid taking unwise chances, such as travelling to remote areas without an adequate escort,

and also persuade them to be as irregular in their movements as the circumstances of their employment will allow, and not to give information of their intended movements to any person other than their own personal friends or responsible members of the Security Forces.

District Officers should be requested to give similar instructions to their European Staff.

File No: 6

December 1951 – January 1952 Pages: 49 Secret: 2 Top Secret: 1

Top Secret

Perak Contingent Police and 3 Commando Brigade RM Op Instruction No. 2

Operation "Turnip"

INFORMATION

- 1. The Secretary of State for the Colonies will visit IPOH 5 Dec 51*
- 2. 3 Commando Brigade RM has been given the overall responsibility for his protection*
- 3. Op. Instr. No. 1 is cancelled*

INVENTION

- 4. LYTTLETON WILL LIVE*

METHOD

- 5. His visit is to be looked upon as a straightforward battle with the bandits*
- 6. Responsibilities for protection*

Top Secret – to be burnt before reading

24th January 1952

Operation Order No. VAT 69

INFORMATION

The Wolves Bdo is now firmly entrenched in Tapah. Bdc. HQ is at Bungalow 199 Rest House Hill

INTENTION

To Sabotage the bandit effort to create alarm and despondency

METHOD

By lowering spirit to raise the spirits

ADMINISTRATION

All Heads of Departments and their husbands, if any, will report to Bde. HQ. At 2100 hours 2nd February 1952

TRANSPORT

Cars will be parked in the drive, the road, the drains or any flower beds south of HQ. Tanks, submarines and battleships will be parked on the lawns of bungalows either side of Bde. HQ

WEAPONS

25 pdrs. Mortars, rifles, bows and arrows, blowpipes, catapults and peashooters will be deposited in the armoury on arrival

FOOD

Q.M. will issue light repeat light and small rations

DRINK

Q.M. will issue sufficient Gin and Harpic to ensure all ranks go clean round the bend

CHEMICAL WARFARE

In event of detectors or personnel turning green, all persons affected will immediately report to decontamination centres

MEDICAL

Medical Officer will EVACUTE all casualties and issue three aspirins per head

UNIFORM

Solar topees, cholera bolts, spinal pads, puttees and spurs will be worn. Saddles will be carried

INTERCOMMUNICATION

At commencement of operations – by word of mouth, when this fails resort will be made to hand or foot signals.

*Bandit Yam Seng
Barney's Dad*

*Bomo Hassan bin
Towkay Bill*

Unsettling Officer

Sawbones

File No: 7

February 1952 – August 1952 Pages: 164 Secret: 15 Top Secret: 4

Letter

*Brigadier C.F. Phillips.
C/o GPO Ipoh, Perak, Malaya*

17th February 1952

DO/CFP/94

My Dear C.P.O.

I think that it is very important that a careful and full analysis should be made by us jointly on the tangible results of operations "Springtide" and "Broderick".

It should be possible to see how transient or lasting the effects of operation "Springtide" have been, its effect on the number and pattern of major incidents, and may change in the type of targets attacked by the terrorists. For this examination I think we should reply on facts but the opinions of the police and military officers responsible in the areas concerned should also be recorded. It may be that the results are inconclusive.

Early next month it should be possible to record the current effect in South Perak of operation "Broderick". After an interval of time an examination on its lasting effect should also be made.

Unfortunately I have lost the services of David Dawson and it will be some time before his relief, who is a newcomer to Malaya, can be of much assistance in this matter.

So I propose that Penley and Fitzgerald should proceed with the examination of the effects of "Springtide". Do you agree?

*T.Q. Gaffikan Esq.,
Chief Police Officer,
Perak*

Confidential

*Police Headquarters,
Federation of Malaya Police,
Kuala Lumpur*

22nd February 1952

*All Chief Police Officers,
Commandant,
Police Depot.*

*Service in the Special Constabulary to count towards pensionable service in the
Regular Force*

Although formal authority has not yet been received, Government has approved in principle that members of the Special Constabulary (both volunteer enrolments and National Servicemen) who join the Regular Force may count unbroken service in the Special Constabulary towards pensionable service in the Regular Force.

This measure will have retrospective effect and there will, therefore, be a number of men affected.

Because of poor documentation of the Special Constabulary during the early days of its formation and expansion difficulty may be experienced in tracing details of men's service in the Special Constabulary.

Chief Police Officers will therefore prepare nominal rolls of all members of the Special Constabulary who are known to have transferred to the Regular Force (including Jungle Companies) in order that all entitled may benefit in due course.

The following information should be shown:

- (i) S.C. Number*
- (ii) Name*
- (iii) N.R.I.C. Number*
- (iv) Date of enrolment in Special Constabulary*
- (v) Regular Force Number*
- (vi) Date of discharge from Special Constabulary*
- (vii) Date of joining Regular Force*

Commandant, Police Depot is arranging the preparation of similar rolls as far as possible in order that cross checks may be made and will note in future previous service in the Special Constabulary on Agreement Sheets.

This information is to be regard as confidential until further orders, which will include a definition of "unbroken service"

*S.G. Taylor
For Commissioner of Police
Federation of Malaya*

Copy to: Superintendent "personnel"

Confidential

S.O.Ops. (SF) 8/2/14

Tel: IPOH.222/60

Contingent Police Headquarters,
Perak
IPOH

12th May, 1952

Te: O.C. 16 F.J.C.
Titi Ganteng,
Grik

Subject: Clash Between Your Patrol and 1/6th Gurkhas – 27th April '52

Reference: Your 16 FJC/OC/5 dated 28.4.52

I am directed by the Chief Police Officer Perak to draw your attention to the following;

1. *In future clearance must not be given for either units to operate in an area unless you are satisfied that your patrols are properly briefed. If this has to be down by wireless then you must not give clearance until your own patrols have acknowledge your message.*
2. *The Chief Police Officer has no doubt that the rash act of Inspector Yen Yuet Leng in crossing the river despite clear order to the contrary was prompted by keeness to meet the bandits. The Chief Police Officer therefore contemplates no action against this Officer. It must be clearly pointed out to him, however, that his act constituted a disregard of orders which might have had serious consequences.*
3. *With regard to para (a) and (b) the Chief Police Officer trusts you will ensure that these conditions do not occur again. With regard to para (c) the Chief Police Officer directs that the W/T operator concerned by defaulted.*

J.M. Penny
Staff Officer Operations
Perak

Top Secret

Contingent Police Headquarters,
Perak,
IPOH.

22nd September 1952

To: Chief Police Officer
Perak.

Subject: Visit Of Scientific Advisors
Reference: Your Top Secret/Personal letter dated 13.9.52

Herewith my list of suggestions

1. Penly Pulverizor. File Attached
2. Climbing Equipment. A large number of terrorists hideouts, food dumps etc. are located in caves on cliff-sides or on cliff-tops. At the moment no proper climbing equipment exists except ropes and inferior torches. Every Military Unit and Police District should maintain a properly trained 'Cliff Squad' and have the following equipment;
 - a. Long light ropes and grappling irons
 - b. Powerful torches
 - c. Riot guns and gas grenades
 - d. Light strong rope ladders
3. Bullet Proof Vests. A small number of bullet proof vest to be kept at each Circle headquarters for use by S.B. Officers and others raiding or searching houses in Towns in which terrorists are suspected to be hiding. They need only be proof against pistol shots.
4. Armoured Lorries. The North West Frontier Groups in India was equipped with Armoured 3 & 4 ton lorries. These were fitted with long seats facing outwards. Kit was placed on a rack on top of the lorries and they had rifle slits all round. They held 15 men with full kit. These are superior to the GMC for transporting personnel and are, in my opinion, more comfortable and less unwieldy than the Military type Armoured 3 tonner at present in use.
5. Rocket Discharger. Plans for a light HE rocket discharger for use in mountain warfare were submitted to G.H.Q. M.E.F. in 1952 by Major the Hon. R.H. Plunkett (Guides Cavalry). This weapon was known as the "Walking stick rocket discharger". The weapon was not adopted but it should be simple to construct and would be invaluable for Security Forces approaching a terrorist camp. Generally the camp sentry is 200 yards or more from the main camp and is able to give warning to the occupants of

the approach of a S.F. Patrol by firing a shot. The EY rifle has insufficient range on such occasions.

6. *Alarm Rockets. Rockets containing parachute flares would be useful as alarm signals for isolate S.C. Posts.*

*J.M. Penny
S.O.OPS. Perak*

Secret

Federation of Malaya Police

*Special Branch,
Perak,
Police Headquarters,
Ipoh.*

13th December 1952

Our Ref. OFA/1/1/10/2

Subject: Betong Area, South Thailand.

The attached paper on the Betong area, is in general terms, due to two reasons, namely

- (a) *The area has only recently come under this police Contingent, and the records are of recent origin.*
- (b) *No specific instructions as to the exact nature of the paper were given*

Thailand is a source of worry, as it is felt that the communist party within the country is stronger than the Thai Government is prepared to admit, or perhaps knows about. The case with which entry into the country is made by the Malayan terrorists suggests that they are not competent to deal with the situation. The danger will arise when the Government will be provoked to take action and the Communists retaliate.

In the meantime the Malayan terrorists have free access to South Thailand, where they can continue training, arming themselves and planning operations against the Malay people.

The following appendices are attached:

<i>Appendix 'A'</i>	<i>Collated Information</i>
<i>Appendix 'B'</i>	<i>Political Structure and Personalities</i>

*For, Superintendent Special Branch,
Perak*

File No: 9

February 1953 – May 1953. Pages: 171 Secret: 24 Top Secret: 1

*SF.17/2/2
Tel: S.River 222
CTM/CLC*

*District Police Headquarters,
Slim River.*

Mar. 1953

*Chief Police Officer,
Pk.,
IPOH*

For attention of S.O., OPS, Pk.)

*Subject: Incident Re Shooting Of Two Chinese Labourers
At 7am on the 7.3.53, a patrol from "C" Coy, 2nd Battalion Malay Regiment
consisting of 2 Corporals, 8.M.O.R's., and 2 S.E.P's, were patrolling the area VP
4464, 4764 and 4663.*

At approximately 11.50 am while moving in single file the leading scout, an S.E.P. saw 4 Communist Terrorists at VP 443638 consisting of 2 males and 2 females armed with 2 pistols. 1 rifle and 1 shot-gun, sitting down. The patrol then immediately froze on the orders of the leading scout and signalled the information back to the patrol commander who moved forward to get a better view. The second scout (S.E.P. also) then opened fire as the terrorists and spotted the patrol and were running away. The corporal then gave the orders to advance and the terrorists fled into a patch of belukar chased by the patrol. One female was seen to be hit in the leg. On approaching the belukar the patrol heard voices so they sprayed the belukar. On proceeding further they met a group of Chinese labourers who had been slashing the belukar and discovered two had been wounded, one in the stomach and the other in the forearm. Blood trails were also found suspected to be from the female Communist Terrorist who had been wounded. These were followed up but were lost. The two wounded labourers were then give first aid treatment and brought to Tanjong Malim Hospital where they received further treatment and were despatched to Kuala Lumpur General Hospital. The man who was wounded in the stomach succumbed to his wounds en route. The names of the labourers are;

Hong Yit, Aged 50, died of wounds

Ho Hee, Aged 40, Gun shot wound in the right forearm. Conditions satisfactory

An operation is still in progress in the same area.

*C.T. Miller
O.C.P.D.
Slim River*

Confidential

OPS 300/06

Operations Information Branch,
Federal Police Headquarters,
Bluff Road,
Kuala Lumpur

7th April '53

All Chief Police Officers

Operational Casualties – Police

The Commissioner of Police is gravely concerned at the number of Police casualties inflicted by “friendly” forces engaged on joint operations. Accidents of this force and the general public, must be avoided.

Briefing Officers must make it their absolute responsibility to ensure that every member of a patrol is thoroughly briefed before he is sent out to participate in an operation.

The majority of casualties invariably result from “friendly” patrols of failing to recognise one another, either

- (a) because of an inadequate display of recognition insignia*
- (b) because both, or one of the patrols is ignorant of the presence of the other in the area*

Before a patrol moves out on an operation it must be the absolute responsibility of the Briefing Officer to ensure

- (a) That the Staff Officer Operations at Combined Operations District H.Q. level has been fully informed of the intended operation*
- (b) That clearance has been obtained from the Staff Officer Operations at Combined Operations District HQ to proceed with the Operation/patrol*
- (c) That the patrol leader and all members of the patrol have been given a full and proper brief*
- (d) That every member of the patrol understands that he must at all times during the patrol wear the approved, easily distinguishable and pre-arranged recognition insignia*
- (e) That every member of the patrol has been informed of all other friendly patrols operation in the same of adjacent areas, and that all are fully conversant with the password and recognition insignia worn by the neighbouring patrols*
- (f) That a thorough inspection is made of the patrol of ascertain that every member is properly uniformed armed, and equipped and that the patrol leader has the correct operation map and a compass and is capable of using both*

When defining operational/patrol limits, full use must be made of easily recognisable physical boundaries such as hill features, major streams, rivers, valleys and well defined tracks. These readily enable a patrol to recognise its own area and minimise the rise of a clash with neighbouring friendly patrols.

Sufficient copies of this letter are circulated for distribution to all O's. S.P.C. and O's. C.P.D.

*Sgd. W.P. Thompson SAC/B
For Commissioner of Police*

File No. 10

May 1953 – August 1953 Pages: 163 Secret: 14 Top Secret: -

Letter

CP (SR) 472

*Police Headquarters,
Bluff Road,
Kuala Lumpur.*

15th May 1953

Fort Operation Diary

In order that the maximum use may be made of the tactical information obtained by deep jungle fort garrisons it is imperative that a detailed diary is maintained by the fort commander

In consultation with H.Q. Malaya, it has been agreed that this diary can be best kept in the form of a War Diary and a specimen forwarded together with instructions for compilation and disposal area attached to this letter. The diary will be classified as a SECRET document.

Sufficient copies of this letter area enclosed for distribution to all Federal Jungle Coys. Under your command.

*Superintendent Operations
For Commissioner of Police*

Invitation



*Coronation Celebrations Committee,
c/o Assistant District Office,
Jerantut,
Fahang.*

30th May 1953

Dear Sir,

I am directed by my Committee to write and thank you for your kind donations towards their Coronation Fund.

I am to say that you are cordially invited to attend the celebrations of Her Majesty's Coronation.

I have enclosed a copy of the programme for the two days.

Yours sincerely,

*(G.R. Knowles)
Honorary Secretary,
Coronation Celebration Committee,
Jerantut.*

The Police College

Group Study – Major Incident

Railway Disaster

You are the O.C.P.D. High Street, Kuala Lumpur and at 11am you receive a telephone message from the Station Master, Kuala Lumpur Station, that a few seconds earlier, a twin-engine Malayan Airways aircraft had crashed on a passenger train stationary in the station.

The wreckage of the plane is blazing and setting fire to the carriages of the train which are badly damaged.

He states that he fears that lost of life is heavy

Describe in detail the action you would take immediately on receipt of the information and all subsequent steps to the conclusion of the occurrence.

Letter

*From: Major D.L. Lloyd Owen, DSO, MC,
Military Assistant to H.E. the High Commissioner*

Ref: KHY 42/52/A

18th August 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you for your SF (SR) 5/A/1 dated 15th August, 1953.

I do not wish to take issue with you on this subject, as you know as well as I do how very necessary it is to maintain the utmost secrecy.

The only point which I would stress is that there is absolutely no necessity whatsoever for a Home Guard Officer in Kuala Kangsar to know the complete details of a tour by H.E. the High Commissioner in Perak. I am sure you will realise that this is obvious sense. The instructions on this subject are quite clearly laid down in a Director of Operations Instruction.

Let us leave it at that!

*A.S. Barham Esq.,
Deputy Chief Police Officer,
Perak,
Contingent Police Headquarters,
IPOH.*

File No: 11

August 1953 – December 1953 Pages: 158 Secret: 12 Top Secret: 1

Letter

*From J.N.D. Harrison,
Chief Police Officer,
Perak,
Ipoh.*

21st September 1953

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

Dear

When I saw you last you mentioned that the D. of O. was of the opinion that Perak S.W.E.C. did not do enough to initiate operations and although I think the position has

improved greatly lately, I do agree that there is room for still more direction and trust from S.W.E.C. level.

I have discussed the position frankly with Brigadier Townsend and we have decided that he and I must undertake the top level planning with assistance of Head, Special Branch, details of such plans to be worked on by our respective staffs and by the D.W.E.C.'s in the areas concerned.

This will mean that I will not be in office very much by day, and will have to rely on evening work to keep pace with the office work. I do feel, however, that the overall conduct of the war is all important, and although we have killed many more C.T.'s in August and this month then was the case earlier in the year, we can step this up still further.

You can guess how pleased we were to get Yong Hoi. We are confident that we can bring to boot the remainder of his forces. I have always held that the Tapah/Bidor/Cameron Highlands/Jelai area to be of the utmost importance and I am sure that there remains a great deal of C.T. activity to be uncovered in that area. We are now actively planning Operation "Perumal" which we cover the Sungei Siput area and the Bubu Forest Reserve between Kuala Kangsar and Taiping. We very nearly killed the commander of the 8th Regt. Today, and have to his diary which may help with the planning.

The second phase of Operation "Knot" over the Thai border began yesterday, and will, I hope, be as successful in its first. In addition, Operation "Hunter" in its next phase will come off very shortly. It was in the first round that 1/6 G.R. killed 6 C.T's but we hope this time to get several more and at a higher level.

H.E. has ordered us to try to clean up Sitiawan so that it may become a "White Area" soon. We started off today with a good kill by A.S.U. and I hope the S.O.V.F. will again distinguish itself there. Further north, in Taiping, Gray is busy laying on operations on our side to fit in with Operation "Sword" in the Bongsu area of Kedah.

Yours

*W.L.R. Carbonell Esq.,
Commissioner of Police,
Federation of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur.*

File No: 12

January 1954 – June 1954 Pages: 135 Secret: 18 Top Secret: 3

Secret

Urgent

Federation of Malaya Police

Circle Police Headquarters,

IPOH.

January 1954

C.P.O. Perak

Subject: Air Strike – Gunong Kanthan on 5.1.54

I attach a copy of my orders to OCPD's in Ipoh Circle.

At a briefing conference held this afternoon the following points were raised and action will be taken accordingly.

- a. If, due to weather conditions, the Air Strike cannot take place at 0700 hrs the arrangements made for clearing the are will continue to 0730 hrs by which time, if the strike has not taken place, the restrictions will be lifted and the strike called off.*
- b. Arrangements have been made that the Station Master at Chemor will be notified immediately the Air Strike is over in order that any trains held up may proceed.*
- c. In the event of it being discovered at day-break that due to weather or any other conditions the strike cannot take place, Mr. Jefferies, Malayan Railways, phone Ipoh 615, will be informed immediately.*
- d. An Officer will be in charge of each of the road blocks established at Rimba Panjang and Kanthan New Village.*

(C.D. Hitcham)
Officer Supt. Police Circle
IPOH

Personal & Confidential

District Office,
Upper Perak.

Grik: 11th January 1954

No. (6) in D.O.U.P. Secret 8/53

Dear

I had hoped to have met you officially before now to mention a matter of considerable concern to myself and the members of my District War Executive Committee. I hope you will forgive me writing to you personally about it.

My District War Executive Committee is concerned about the present ineffectual executive mechanism of the State War Executive Committee. Nothing happens. No action is ever taken on our minutes. Queries remain unanswered. Requests remain unfulfilled and confused instructions have been received from the Executive Secretary on many matters.

We still have faith in the members of the State War Executive Committee but none in its present ineffective mechanism. This may not be so important now but if there is a deterioration of the present situation and C.T. activity increases, administrative chaos will result. It is impossible to get clear-cut answers from the present Executive Secretary.

Yours sincerely,

C.G. Ferguson

*The Hon'ble Mr. I.W. Bletloch,
British Adviser,
Perak,
IPOH.*

Confidential

*Federal Police Headquarters,
Bluff Road,
Kuala Lumpur*

15th February 1954

All Chief Police Officers

(With sufficient copies of attachment for distribution to all O.S.P.C's and O.C.P.D's)

Relations with the Public

Owing to the fact that incidents have arisen which suggest that some of our officers do not appreciate the position of the Police – and the individual Policeman or officer – in relation to the public, I feel that it is timely that a note should be issued to stimulate officers into checking over their mental attitudes in such matters.

C.P.O's will please ensure that all their officers are made aware of this, and to that end I am distributing copies for O.S.P.C.'s and O.C.P.D.'s, so that they in turn may pass on this advice to all officers associated with their formations, and in order that the rank and file may also be instructed through the S.P.O.'s. A Malay version of this note is also being distributed.

This document is marked Confidential, because it is not for outside me. It is intended purely to stimulate the thoughts of the members of the Police in order that they may comport themselves adequately in the eyes of the public. This document therefore must be regarded as confidential in the sense that it is purely for the information and instruction of members of the Force.

*(J.N.M.A. Nicholls)
Acting Commissioner of Police*



File No: 13

June 1954 – December 1954 Pages: 125 Secret: 11 Top Secret: -

Letter

*Combined Mil/Pol OPS Room,
Batu Gajah*

17th June 1954

*Chief Police Officer Ops,
Perak.*

Subject: Murder on 17.6.54 in the Ulu Johan Area

On 17.6.54 at VJ.803658 6.30am in the Ulu Johan, a lorry carrying mining labourers from Menglembu to the Wah Tong Mine found a body of a male Chinese, approximately 250 yards from the mine, aged about 25 years old, he had been shot through the left kidney from the rear and also through the right shoulder from the front. Beside the body were found a number of C.T. documents, handwritten and 1 empty case. 303. Labourers on the lorry could not identify the body but documents state that his name was WONG CHING YUEN Alias AH KOW.

Special Branch Comment

This man is not a Batu Gajah Special Branch Source. As the body could not be identified by the coolies from the mine it is suggested that he may have been taken from Bukit Merah New Village during the night. He was dressed in a white shirt and

a pair of long blue trousers he also had a handkerchief tied around his forehead which could have been used to blindfold him

Follow up is being carried out by 7 PL. 'C' Coy 1/W/Yorks. It is believed that C.T's moved N/West from incident.

*(N.J. Cirtus)
S.O. OPS
Batu Gajah*

Confidential

*J.N.D. Harrison Esq.,
Chief Police Officer,
Perak.*

15th September 1954

Visit of Parliamentary Mission

I am directed by the Commissioner of Police to thank you for your letter (SR) 132/20, dated 13th August, 1954, informing him of the incident between Sir Robert Boothby and the 15/19th Hussars.

The Commissioner is glad that you have informed him of this incident, but he will not take any action unless the matter is brought up by someone else.

*(D.W. Yates)
Federal Police Secretary*

File No: 14

December 1954 – June 1955 Pages: 120 Secret: 14 Top Secret: 3

Secret

Federation of Malaya Police

*Contingent Special Branch,
Perak,
IPOH.
15th Feb. 1955*

*Subject: Documents Recovered On 1st January 1955
at Mr. VK. 1706 Bikam Estate (Tapah District)*

Bundles of propaganda leaflets (including "new life" were found and passed to State Information Officer.

Document A. is a handwritten leaflet in the name of the Anti-British organisation of BIDOR. It concerns the "sins" of YEUNG YAT PING who were murdered on 1st Jan. 55 at the spot where the document were found.

Readers are exhorted to get rid of "running dogs", detectives and informers. YEUNG YAT PING's 'Sins' are then detailed. Neither the victim's nor the other two names mentioned are on record here.

Presumably the European Estate manager referred to is WATTS CARTER.

*(R.A. Ruegg)
for Head Special Branch,
Perak,
IPOH.*

Letter

*Headquarters,
No. 4 Police Field Force,
Kulai.*

4th June 1955

*Officer Commanding,
No. 4 Police Field Force,
Kulai.*

Police Lieutenant M.J. Collins

I wish to bring to your notice my remarks on the above officer.

On two occasions during the past six months I have had to reprimand him for insolence. On both occasions I was addressing NCO's of his Platoon when the incidents occurred. On the first occasion an NCO of his Platoon was late in performing a duty I had ordered and I was reprimanding the NCO with P/Lt. Collins interfered in a most insolent manner. I found it necessary to warn him to watch his behaviour.

On the second occasion I was again addressing an NCO of his Platoon when P/Lt. Collins behaved insolently and in a manner of unbecoming of an Officer. This was performed in front of his Platoon which made his show of lack of discipline all the more serious. I ordered him to my office where I warned him his behaviour would be reported to the Officer Commanding. I also warned him that in the event of a repetition of this conduct he would be taken before the Chief Police Officer.

My observations of this Officer are that he lacks in discipline and is inclined to be of the "barrack room lawyer" type.

This report is forwarded for your information.

(D.J. O'Duffy)

No. 4 Police Field Force,
Kulai.

File No: 15

June 1955 – February 1956 Pages: 163 Secret: 25 Top Secret: -

Secret

Headquarters,
No. 4 Police Field Force,
Kulai,
Johore.

4th July 1955

Chief Police Officer,
Jahore.

*Numbering of Composite Riot Unit
Sections*

I have experimented with the various types of markings on the Steel Helmets of O.C. Riot Unit, 2 i/c, i/c T.S./R./S and Section Commanders, and have found that the under mentioned markings have proved to be successful during our practices:

- | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------|--|
| (1) | <i>O.C. Riot Unit</i> | <i>White squares of checker board five one inch squares on both sides of the Helmets</i> |
| (2) | <i>2 i/c & C.C. Lathi</i> | <i>Two bars of 2" in length half inch apart vertically, on both sides of Helmets</i> |
| (3) | <i>i/c T.S./R.S.</i> | <i>1½ triangle on both sides of Helmets</i> |
| (4) | <i>2 i/c Lathi Sections</i> | <i>Two half inch stripes half inch apart running from front to rear across the crown</i> |
| (5) | <i>Section Commanders</i> | <i>One long strip 1½ wide running from the front of the Helmet to the rear across the crown</i> |
| (6) | <i>The Lathi Sections</i> | <i>Armllets of two inches coloured cloth worn on right sleeve;
No.1 Lathi Section – Red
No.2 Lathi Section – White
No.3 Lathi Section – Green
No.4 Lathi Section – Black</i> |

The object being that the Lathi Sections who have to advance about 40 x 50 yards in front of the Command Vehicle can easily be identified from afar, whereas the numbering on the Helmets may not be distinguished in the confusion during a struggle.

(Hisham Bin HJ. Nawai)

*Officer Commanding,
No. 4 Police Field Force*

Secret

*Director of Operations' Staff,
Bluff Road,
Kuala Lumpur*

25th August, 1955

The Chairman

*All State/Settlement War Executive Committees
(With copies for all members of SWECs and DWECs) (Lists A & C)*

Considerations Concerning A Declaration Of Amnesty

It has been announced on a number of occasions that government has under consideration whether at an appropriate moment an amnesty should be declared. Members of SWECs and DEWCs should be aware of the arguments, which government and the Director of Operations in particular have had under consideration in this matter. This memorandum explains them. It is designed as, and is intended to be, a brief for SWEC and DWEC members only. It should be used as such and not issued to other persons.

The reasoning, which led up to, the rejection of the MCP offer to negotiate has been explained and therefore need not be repeated in this paper.

File No: 16

February 1956 – March 1956. Pages: 151 Secret: 15 Top Secret: 10

Top Secret

Federation of Malaya Police

*Contingent Special Branch,
Perak,
Ipoh.*

21st February 1956

Operations in South Thailand/Perak Border Intelligence Review

Object

The object of this paper is to summaries present intelligence available on the CTO in the Betong Salient and to review Intelligence Sources available in this area with future operations in the South Thailand in view.

Introduction

During the period May – Sept '55, during the currency of Op. "Unity", five platoons of Field Force were continuously deployed in the Betong Salient, operating in conjunction with Thai Police Forces. During this operation which was mounted in the basis low grade intelligence reports, some six months old,

*12 Contacts with CTs' were made
3 CTs' were killed
8 CTs' were wounded
1 CT was captured
1 CT surrendered
80 Camps
20 Resting places were found
2 Batches of documents of interest were recovered*

Confidential

29th March 1956

*The Adviser on Aborigines,
Kuala Lumpur*

Critical Situation in the Port Brooke Area

In confirmation of my telephone call to you yesterday afternoon, I have to inform you that the situation in the Fort Brooke area was discussed at the Ops. SWEC yesterday morning. Copies of both your letter No. R/54/8D of 22.3.56 and my letter No. (16) in PK.Abor.13/55 were circulated as was also a letter put up by the Police headed General Situation in the Fort Brooke area, a copy of which is attached herewith.

It was decided to accept the Police explanation of why the Aborigines had not been re-armed when SWEC had given its orders previously. However, as the Police were unable to agree with my Paper in regard to the situation in Fort Brooke, it was agreed to accept your suggestion of an investigation to be held as early as possible on the question of the attitude of the Aborigines towards the Fort Commander in the Fort Brooke area.

It was agreed that you should represent our Department on this investigation, but the C.P.O. objected to Superintendent has only recently taken over this appointment and may not yet have sufficient experience regarding Aborigines. The C.P.O. then nominated the Deputy Chief Police Officer, Mr. Barham, to represent the Police, and it was finally decided that the Executive Secretary, S.W.E.C. should be a third member to complete a Board of three officers to investigate the situation in the Fort Brooke area.

I was asked to contact you as early as possible and to ask you to let us know what date would be suitable to you to carry out this investigation.

*(R.C. Corfield)
Protector of Aborigines, Perak*

File No: 17

July 1956 – September 1956 Pages: 129 Secret: 18 Top Secret: -

Secret

*Contingent Police Headquarters,
Perak,
Ipoh.*

14th July 1956

Operational Order

Visit Of Thai Police Party To Perak

Information *On 19th July 1956 a Thai Police party will visit Perak. This party will consist of*

- | | |
|--|--|
| <i>(a) Brigadier Faed Vijjabhamd</i> | <i>Commander 9th Region, Songkhla</i> |
| <i>(b) Nai Charn Charuvat</i> | <i>Deputy Regional Governor, 9th Region,
Songkhla</i> |
| <i>(c.) Lt. Col. Serm Patanakumchon</i> | <i>Head Special Branch Combined Team,
Songkhla</i> |
| <i>(d) Lt. Col. Prakarnjana
Puranatnorugsa</i> | <i>Asst. Staff Officer of the Military Force
Engaged in anti Communist Terrorist
operations on the Thai Side of the
frontier</i> |
| <i>(e) Police Captain Chalong</i> | <i>Special Branch, Songkhla</i> |
| <i>(f) C.T. Miller, ASP</i> | <i>F. of M. Police</i> |

Mr. Miller will accompany the party and will act as conducting officer throughout this visit.

Includes:

The Security Forces Weekly Intelligence Summary

Copy No. 334. Number 327

Copy No. 334. Number 329

Copy No. 334. Number 330

Copy No. 334. Number 331

Copy No. 334. Number 332

File No: 18

September 1956 – November 1956. **Pages: 152 Secret: 14 Top Secret: 2**

Top Secret

Intelligence Appreciation For Operational Planning For The First Half of 1957

Note: With the exception of paragraph 1, this Appreciation is based on intelligence received up to 15th September 1956

M.C.P. Policy Affecting The Security Situation In The First Half of 1957

General

Outwardly there has been no change in the M.C.P.'s policy regarding the ending of the Emergency. Following the M.C.P.'s "Statements" on the Baling Talks and the London Constitutional Conference, issued at the end of March, 1956 (see previous Appreciation for the Second Half of 1956) on 29th September, 1956, the M.C.P. made a further move in its attempt to gain support for its own "peace terms" and – as a matter of course – opposition to the elected Government in the form of an "United Front". This move was in the form of a "letter of greeting" to the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The letter was duly publicized by Radio Peking, thus setting upon it the seal of the C.C.P.'s approval for the present attitude of the M.C.P. No doubt this is designed to have an effect both on the C.T.O. and on waverers amongst the Chinese population in Malaya. It will reassure the C.T.'s of China's moral support and will encourage them to "hang out" in the expectation that the Federation Government will be forced to relax its "peace terms". And it may persuade some Chinese civilians to ingratiate themselves with the Communists by supporting the United Front opposition movement.

*Police Headquarters,
Federation of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur*

29th November 1956

*All Field Force Commanders
All Fort Commanders*

Top Secret

*Police Headquarters,
Federation of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur.*

29th November 1956

*All Field Force Commanders
All Fort Commanders*

Subject: Delayed Action Ground Market Flares

A copy of Joint Army/Air Instruction No. 13 on the above subject is forwarded herewith for information and action where necessary.

The issue of these flares within the Police will be at the rate of 6 per P.F.F. Unit and 2 per Jungle Fort. It is the Director of Operations' laid down policy that camps will be bombed wherever possible rather than being attacked by ground troops in the first instance.

Field Force and Fort Commanders have already seen a demonstration of this equipment at the recent conference in Kuala Lumpur. Further demonstrations down to Platoon Commander and Platoon Sergeant level are now being arranged to take place in individual Police Field Force areas.

*(E. Morrow)
Superintendent Field Force
For Commissioner of Police*

File No: 19

December 1956 – July 1957 Pages: 140 Secret: 15 Top Secret: -

Secret

*District & Land Office,
Ipoh.*

17th January 1957

No. (46) In DOI (C) 19/53

*Executive Secretary
Perak S.W.E.C.
Ipoh.*

*Assistance To CTO From Resettled Aborigines In Ipoh And Sungei Siput Police
District*

I attach hereto a letter from D.S.B.O. to C.P.O. In addition to the information mentioned in paragraph 6 of this letter, item 8 of Sitrep No. 1/57 and Item 8 of Sitrep No. 363/56 indicate the close degree of contact between the CTO and the Aborigines. Ulu Kinta Ops D.W.E.C. consider that the following measures should be implemented to deal with the Aborigine problem

- (a) Units of Security Forces should live in Aborigine Settlements and patrol in their immediate vicinity*
- (b) A Field Assistant should be provided for each Settlement or group of Settlements*
- (c) More interrogators should be provided*
- (d) Other units of Security Forces should patrol outside of the locality mentioned in (a) to deny contact between Aborigines and the CTO*

Confidential

*Contingent Police Headquarters,
Perak,
Ipoh.*

4th June 1957

*C.P.O.
(Attention: D.C.P.O.)*

P/IT. F.G. Dawson

I refer to your letter in this series dated 1st June 1957 to OCPD, Ipoh, copied to me.

On 31st May 1957 I received a telephone call from OCPD Ipoh concerning a case in which he alleged Police Lieutenant Dawson had entered a house without the appropriate search warrant. OCPD requested me to inform P/Lt. Dawson that he was referring the matter to C.P.O.

On two occasions that same day I attempted to contact P/Lt. Dawson by telephone without success. Finally at approximately 3.45pm P/Lt/ Dawson phoned me and said that he believed that I had been trying to get in touch with him.

I passed the OCPD's message to him whereupon he appeared to be very angry and said a number of things concerning the OCPD all of which I am unable to recall, but he did say that "if the OCPD was trying to drop him he would physically assault him and was prepared to risk imprisonment for it" or words to that effect.

I cannot recall that I said as I was rather taken aback by the remarks of P/Lt Dawson but before I could say very much he put the phone down. I am quiet certain however he did use the expressions "physically assault" and "risk imprisonment".

(D.J. O'Duffy)

File No: 20

September 1957 – June 1958 Pages: 124 Secret: 10 Top Secret: -

Secret

*Combined Police/Military Operations Room,
Ipoh.*

22nd August, 1957

*Visit Of His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester To Perak on 3rd September
1957*

*Attached hereto is Copy No..... of the Operation Order in connection with the visit of
His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester to Perak on 3rd September 1957.*

*Will addresses concerned please note what action is required of them. If they are in
doubt on any point addresses should contact the Combined Operations Room,
Contingent Police Headquarters, Ipoh, for clarification but should bear in mind that
the subject matter is SECRET.*

*If any amendments are received before the arrival of His Royal Highness the Duke
addresses concerned will be advised accordingly.*

*(M.P. Lemercier) Capt.
for Comd. 28 Comwel Indep. Inf. Bde.*

*(D.J. O'Duffy)
For Chief Police Officer,
Perak.*

Secret

Copy No. 27

*Combined Ops. Room,
Sungei Siput,
Perak.*

27th December, 1957

*Central Perak WEC Operation Order No. 1/57
Operation "Ginger"*

Ref Maps: HIND1 inch to mile. Malaya Series.

SITUATION

1. *CTO*
See Appreciation at Annex A
2. *Friendly Forces*
The following resources will be available
 - (a) Army
28 COMWEL Bde and att troops
 - (b) RAF
On call through normal channels
 - (c) Police
See Annex D

File No: 21

July 1958 – May 1959 Pages: 126 Secret: 3 Top Secret: -

Includes

State of Perak Programme of the Official Visit to Perak of Their Majesties The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong From Sunday 21st September 1958 to Tuesday 23rd September 1958 18pp.

Their Majesties the Majesties The Yang Di-Pertuan Agong and the Raja Permaisuri Agong are making an Official Visit to Perak from Sunday, 21.9.58 to Tuesday 23.9.58. Their Majesties and Entourage are travelling on the Royal Train from the North and are expected to arrive at the State Boundary at approximately 3.00pm.



Confidential

*Pejabat Ketua Pegawai Polis,
Polis Di-Raja Persekutuan*

13th May 1959

*The Hon'ble the State Secretary, Perak
Commissioner of Police
H.S.B. Perak
O.C. CID Perak
OC 2 PFF (at Pangkor)
2FFF
OSPC Taiping
OCID Sitiawan
OCPD Teluk Anson
OC FRU, K.L.
Dy. Chairman, PK. SWEC
State Information Officer
2 Fed Inf Bde
28 Comwel Bde*

Pangkor Future Intentions

Below are the immediate future intentions of the Chief Police Officer with regards to Pangkor Island, assuming all quiet;

15th May

- 1. 'Y' troop of the FRU will return to base in Kuala Lumpur and will be replaced by one RU from 2PFF. The FRU will remain overnight at 2 PFF camp and depart for K.Lumpur on 16th May.*
- 2. The twp P.F.F.RU's at Sungei Pinang Kechil will be withdrawn and replaced by One RU from P.F.F. leaving only two RU's on the Island i.e. one at Pangkor and one at Sungei Pinang Kechil*
- 3. The RU at Bruas (from 2 P.F.F.) will be replaced by another RU from P.F.F.*
- 4. P.S.S.G's at Lumut and Pangkor will return to base and will not be replaced*
- 5. 1 Inspector, I.S.P.O and 9 P.C.'s will remain at Sungei Pinang Kechil for routine duties. They may be replaced or remain as decided by the O.S.P.C. Taiping (These men come from Taiping)*
- 6. On completion of these moves O.S.P.C. Tailing will assume overall command. He will base himself at Pangkor Police Station. O.C. 2 P.F.F. will relinquish command.*

File No: 22.

November 1959 – July 1960 Pages: 58 Secret: 1 Top Secret: -

Newspapers clipping

Saturday Post. No. 13. 7th November 1959. The People's Paper. In this issue;

<i>S'pore Gangsters and Amnesty</i>	<i>Page 4</i>
<i>"Ambulance Chasers" Racket</i>	<i>Page 5</i>
<i>Graduate Teachers</i>	<i>Page 7</i>
<i>MTUC Appeal for UN Man</i>	<i>Page 12</i>

Confidential & Personal

*Perjabat Ketua Pegawai Polis,
Polis Di-Raja Persekutuan,
Ipoh.*

6th November 1959

*Mr. D.J. O'Duffy
S.O. Ops*

Sub: Leakage of Official Matters

It has come to my notice that there is a serious leakage of information contained in official files such as Investigation Papers, PEP's, SDR's and other secret and confidential correspondence.

There is a certain amount of suspicion as to the persons responsible for the leakage, which has been occurring from time to time. The leakage is believed to be both from Police Officers and Clerical Staff.

Your attention is drawn to the provisions of the Official Secret Ordinance Section 5, and Government General Circular No. 2 of 1952, the contents of which are for strict compliance. Investigation Papers, PEP's, TAP's, SDR's are all confidential documents within the meaning of Government General Circular No. 2 of 1952. I want you to keep an eye on all your junior officers and clerical staff in this connection and bring to my notice any instance of leakage.

You are to acknowledge receipt of this letter and return the attached proforma duly completed.

*(C.K. Brown)
Chief Police Officer,
Perak*

Secret

Operation "Magnet"

Notes on the Operation As If Affected 8 PFF

Reference 8 PFF Op Order No. 1/60 dated 23rd April' 60

Introduction

1. *The sequence of events and the execution of the technique evolved for this type of operation went exactly according to plan.*
2. *For this reason and for the fact that there were no CT in target areas, little of value arose out of the actual debriefing.*
3. *There are, however, points of interest concerning any operation of this type.*

APPRECIATION

4. *The type of target for which the technique was devised is a strongly defensible camp, encompassed by a continuous fire-trench access to which, from any point in the camp, is by crawl-trench. At strategic points in the perimeter are strong points perhaps with overhead protection. The whole camp is surrounded by a necklace of deep, perfectly camouflaged panji pits, surface panji's and some mines situated just within the limit of visibility and where attackers may well seek cover.*
5. *It was anticipated that all feasible approaches would be swept by light-automatic and rifle-fire and that a small party would hold off attackers while the remainder packed-up and withdrew. It would then withdraw itself.*
6. *A physical assault on such a target would result in undue SF casualties.*
7. *It was decided, therefore, the flush the CT by fire from a distance into a close cordon and to enter the obstacle zone only when it was possible to negotiate obstacles with reasonable security.*
8. *Difficult terrain and well-sited sentry-posts would make it necessary to cordon at some 300 yards radius from the camp. This would mean a very wide circumference, which in turn would lead to a large force if the cordon were to be truly effective.*